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Abstract
The insider threat ranks among the most pressing cyber-security challenges
that threaten government and industry information infrastructures.
To date, no systematic methods have been developed that provide a
complete and effective approach to prevent data leakage, espionage, and
sabotage. Current practice is forensic in nature, relegating to the analyst
the bulk of the responsibility to monitor, analyze, and correlate an overwhelming
amount of data. We describe a predictive modeling framework
that integrates a diverse set of data sources from the cyber domain, as well
as inferred psychological/motivational factors that may underlie malicious
insider exploits. This comprehensive threat assessment approach
provides automated support for the detection of high-risk behavioral
"triggers" to help focus the analyst's attention and inform the analysis.
Designed to be domain-independent, the system may be applied to many
different threat and warning analysis/sense-making problems.
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Abstract
The insider threat ranks among the most pressing cyber-security challenges that threaten government and industry information infrastructures. To date, no systematic methods have been developed that provide a
complete and effective approach to prevent data leakage, espionage, and
sabotage. Current practice is forensic in nature, relegating to the analyst
the bulk of the responsibility to monitor, analyze, and correlate an overwhelming amount of data. We describe a predictive modeling framework
that integrates a diverse set of data sources from the cyber domain, as well
as inferred psychological/motivational factors that may underlie malicious insider exploits. This comprehensive threat assessment approach
provides automated support for the detection of high-risk behavioral
"triggers" to help focus the analyst's attention and inform the analysis.
Designed to be domain-independent, the system may be applied to many
different threat and warning analysis/sense-making problems.

Introduction
Imagine this (very general) scenario:
John has been a productive employee for several years, but is extremely
disappointed when he feels that other coworkers have taken credit for
some of his accomplishments and he is passed over for a coveted promo-
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tion. Filled with bitterness and frustration after being accused of inappropriate conduct at work, he negotiates with an outside entity to exploit
his position to the benefit of the competition, planning later to join the
competitor's organization.
This brief scenario is a high-level description of a typical insider threat
case. The insider threat refers to harmful acts that trusted insiders might
carry out, such as something that causes harm to the organization or an
unauthorized act that benefits the individual. Information "leakage," espionage, and sabotage involving computers and computer networks are the
most notable examples of insider threats, and these acts are among the
most pressing cyber-security challenges that threaten government and
private-sector information infrastructures. The insider threat is manifested when human behaviors depart from established policies, regardless
of whether they result from malice, disregard, or ignorance.
In the scenario above, if we jump back to the time of the Revolutionary
War, we can see close parallels to the case of Benedict Arnold, who in
1780 conspired with the British to work towards the surrender of West
Point following events between 1777 and 1779 involving his being passed
over for promotion and being accused of financial schemes. Viewing the
general scenario in more modern times, one can see parallels with the
career of Aldrich Ames, a CIA operative from the late 1950s to the late
1980s. Ames initially received enthusiastic and positive reviews, but had
continuing problems with alcoholism, security violations leading to reprimands, extramarital affairs that violated policy, and financial problems
that reportedly led him to become a spy for the Soviet Union. In even
more contemporary times, we may consider the case of accused
WikiLeaks insider Bradley Manning, a despondent and disillusioned
Army intelligence officer who experienced a series of emotional upheavals, including the breakup of a personal relationship, and whose disgruntled and inappropriate workplace behavior led to his demotion to Private/
First Class before he allegedly leaked hundreds of thousands of U.S.
Department of Defense and Department of State diplomatic cables.1
Surveys and studies conducted over the last decade and a half have consistently shown the critical nature of the problem in both government and
private sectors. A 1997 Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General
report found that 87% of identified intruders into DoD information systems were either employees or others internal to the organization.2 The
annual e-Crime Watch Survey conducted by Chief Security Officer (CSO)
Magazine in conjunction with other institutions reveals that for both the
government and commercial sectors,3 the most costly or damaging cybercrime attacks were caused by insiders, such as current or former employ26
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ees and contractors. A recent report covering over one hundred fortythree million data records collected by Verizon and the U.S. Secret Service
analyzed a set of one hundred forty-one confirmed breach cases in 2009
and found that 46% of data breaches were attributed to the work of insiders.4 Of these, 90% were the result of deliberate, malicious acts; six percent were attributed to inappropriate actions, such as policy violations
and other questionable behavior, and four percent to unintentional acts.
One might legitimately ask: Can we pick up the trail before the fact, providing time to intervene and prevent an insider attack? Why is this so
hard? There are several reasons why development and deployment of
approaches to addressing insider threat, particularly proactive
approaches, are so challenging: (a) the lack of sufficient real-world data
that has "ground truth" enabling adequate scientific verification and validation of proposed solutions; (b) the difficulty in distinguishing between
malicious insider behavior and what can be described as normal or legitimate behavior (since we generally don't have a good understanding of
normal versus anomalous behaviors and how these manifest themselves
in the data); (c) the potential quantity of data, and the resultant number
of "associations" or relationships that may emerge produce enormous
scalability challenges; and (d) despite ample evidence suggesting that in a
preponderance of cases, the perpetrator exhibited observable "concerning
behaviors" in advance of the exploit, there has been almost no attempt to
address such human factors by researchers and developers of technologies/tools to support insider threat analysis.5
Both the similarities and differences in cases throughout history reveal
challenges for efforts to combat and predict insider threats. While the
human factor has remained somewhat constant, the methods and skills
that apply to insider exploits have changed drastically in the last few
decades. In the time of Benedict Arnold, and even up to the time of the
exploits of Aldrich Ames and another notorious insider, Robert Hanssen,
an insider had to possess requisite knowledge, direct access to the information to be leaked, physical access to the recipient of the information,
and a physical copy of the information to be exfiltrated. Compared to the
WikiLeaks case, even twenty years ago it would have been necessary to
use an 18-wheeler truck to transport the several hundred thousand documents involved in the WikiLeaks case. Today, insider crime does not even
require specific knowledge of the information to be leaked, and gigabytes
or more of information can be exfiltrated using various means, including
thumb drives, email, and other modern information technology tools.
Attribution is hard, and the ability to predict or catch a perpetrator in the
act is severely limited, especially if the only means of detection is driven
by workstation and network monitoring. Indeed, we have suggested that
27
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the only way to be proactive is for the insider threat warning/analysis system to take non-IT "behavioral" or psychosocial data into account in order
to capitalize on signs and precursors of the malicious activity that are
often evident in "concerning behaviors" prior to the execution of the
crime.6
In this regard, research suggests that in a significant number of cases, the
malicious intent of the perpetrator was "observable" prior to the insider
exploit. For example, a study by the Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT) Insider Threat Center,7 a federally-funded research and
development entity at Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering
Institute, shows that 27% of insiders had come to the attention of either a
supervisor or coworker for some concerning behavior prior to the incident. Examples of concerning behaviors include increasing complaints to
supervisors regarding salary, increased cell phone use at the office, refusal
to work with new supervisors, increased outbursts directed at coworkers,
and isolation from coworkers.8 As described in a recent article on rogue
insiders, the extensive and ongoing investigation of insider threat by
CERT has determined that most cases carry a distinct pattern. According
to CERT's technical manager Dawn Cappelli, "Usually the employees
either have announced their resignation or have been formally reprimanded, demoted, or fired."9 In such cases, the article continues, the
Human Resources department is aware of these high-risk personnel. The
malefactors typically may be categorized as falling into one of two groups:
either those who are moving to a new job and want to take their work with
them, or those who are part of a well-coordinated spy ring operating for
the benefit of a foreign government or organization.

Goal of Insider Threat Research
In an operational context, security analysts must review and interpret a
huge amount of data to draw conclusions about possible suspicious
behaviors that indicate policy violations or other potentially malicious
activities. They apply their domain knowledge to perceive and recognize
patterns within the data. The domain knowledge that analysts possess
facilitates the process of identifying the relevance of and connections
among the data. In our examination of current practice by security, cyber
security, and counterintelligence analysts, we have observed that typically
the analyst uses a number of tools that monitor different types of data to
provide alerts or reports about suspicious activities. This is primarily
done in a forensic mode and within certain domains of data, such as
output from Security Event and Incident Management (SEIM) systems,
network and workstation/system log reports, web-monitoring tools,
28
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access-control monitoring tools, and data loss/data leak protection (DLP)
tools.10 While these tools provide varying levels of protection, they are
primarily forensic in nature, and in general the analyst has the critical and
difficult responsibility for data fusion that integrates the analysis and
"sense-making" across these disparate domains.
To date, no systematic methods have been developed that provide a complete and effective solution to the insider threat. Our goal is to create,
adapt, and apply technology to the insider threat problem by incorporating into a reasoning system the capability to integrate different types of
information that provide a useful picture of a person's motivation, as well
as the capability and opportunity to carry out the crime. In this general
context, our specific objective is to detect anomalous behaviors (insider
threat indicators) before or shortly after the initiation of a malicious
exploit.
Insider-threat assessment falls in the class of problems referred to as illstructured, ill-defined, and wicked. Rittel and Webber defined "wicked
problems" as those having goals that are incomplete, changing, and occasionally, conflicting.11 Klein suggests that most real-world problems are
not well-specified and do not involve "explicit knowledge."12 Wicked
problems defy clarifying goals at the start; we need to reassess our original understanding of the goals, and goals become clearer as we learn
more. Methodologies are heuristic, involving discovery and learning
through an iterative process. Thus, the objectives, concepts of operations,
requirements, and other dictates in the proposed research and development are subject to periodic changes and maturation as the course of
insider threat algorithms and software development matures.
The neocortex was the inspirational metaphor for the design of our reasoning framework, called CHAMPION (for Columnar Hierarchical Autoassociative Memory Processing In Ontological Networks). The neocortex
metaphor serves as inspiration for a functional (not structural) design
that adopts functional requirements, as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Functional requirements inspired by neocortex metaphor.
The processing unit of the neocortex is the cortical column. For the
CHAMPION reasoning system, the central processing unit is the Autoassociative Memory Component (AMC), which mimics the functionality
of the cortical column.

Multiple Domains of Data
The insider threat problem manifests itself within a socio-technical system, a combination of social, behavioral, and technical factors that interact in complex ways.13 Knowledge within each of the factors is captured
(or modeled) in a domain-specific ontology. This modeling approach
organizes the notional concepts within a specific domain into a hierarchical mapping of those concepts. The ontologies are used by the computational reasoning system to interpret patterns within the data.
The rationale for our approach of integrating across different domains of
data is based on a body of scientific research and case studies in the field
of insider threat, cyber security, and social/behavioral sciences, from
which it has been widely concluded that behavioral and psychosocial indicators of threat risk should be taken into account by insider threat analysis systems.14 Indeed, Gudaitis and Schultz have separately argued that
integrated solutions are required.15, 16 As Schultz observed, there is a need
for a "new framework" for insider threat detection based on multiple indicators that not only address workstation and network activity logs but
30
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also include preparatory behavior and verbal behavior, among others.
Thus, analysis of workstation and network data is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for proactive insider threat analysis.
A recent review describes many technical approaches to intrusion detection (including insider threats) that may be characterized according to the
categorization of techniques in terms of threshold, anomaly, rule-based,
and model-based methods.17, 18 Threshold detection is essentially summary statistics (such as counting events and setting off an alarm when a
threshold is exceeded). Anomaly detection is based on identifying events
or behaviors that are statistical outliers; a major drawback of this
approach is its inability to effectively combat the strategy of insiders to
work below the statistical threshold of tolerance and, over time, train systems to recognize increasingly abnormal behavior patterns as normal.
Rule- or signature-based methods are limited to work within the bounds
of the defined signature database; variations of known signatures are easily created to thwart such misuse-detectors, and completely novel attacks
will nearly always be missed. Model-based methods seek to recognize
attack scenarios at a higher level of abstraction than the other approaches,
which largely focus on audit records exclusively as data sources. A sample
of data sources for host- and network-based monitoring data that are relevant to insider threat detection is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Representative Host/Network Cyber Data Monitored for
Insider Threat Analysis
• Registry entries
• Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) events
• Firewall logs
• Domain Name Server (DNS)
logs/Internet sites accessed
• Host event logs
• Host print logs
• Network print logs
• Database server logs
• Web server logs
• Search engine queries (from
query logs)
• Known software signature

• File permissions
• Access to account
• Email content capture
• Email headers
•
•
•
•
•
•

Instant messaging
Keystroke records
Digital signatures
Local stored or cached files
Proximity card data
Applications installed, patch status,
version numbers for host computer
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Tools that focus on behaviors represent a significant advancement, but
strict adherence to a statistically measured anomaly detection approach
(which is in common use today) allows for gaps that may be exploited
and/or go undetected. At the same time, tools that focus on policy violation assessment provide an effective first line of defense but allow for
insider exploits that avoid policy violations. A more integrated approach
that combines these functions would represent a modest advancement.
Still better performance should be achieved by incorporating modelbased technology into an integrated analysis that includes more explicit
"human factors" dimensions, as we describe next.
In keeping with an approach that attempts to reflect relationships
between certain personality characteristics and counterproductive work
behavior or higher-risk employees, we conducted discussions with human
resources (HR) professionals and managers at our organization to identify behavioral "proxies" for such characteristics that may, to varying
degrees, produce a heightened concern about possible insider threat risks.
Informed by the Five Factor Model (FFM) and previous research and case
studies documenting personality disorders and factors of concern,19 these
discussions focused on the kinds of behaviors that would likely be
observed and "known" by managers and HR staff because of the level of
concern that they bring about. The model that evolved from these discussions was therefore highly observation-based, i.e., focusing on observable
behaviors that could be recorded and audited. Therefore, although the
model is based on behavioral observables, it can support making inferences about the possible psychological, personality, and social state of an
employee; hence we refer to our model as a "psychosocial" model to capture the wide spectrum of inferences it is capable of producing.
The implementation of psychosocial reasoning used a data-driven
approach based on personnel data that were likely to be available.20 The
indicators used in the model, such as disgruntlement, anger management
issues, and disregard for authority, are shown in Figure 2. It is worth noting that these psychosocial indicators contribute differentially to the
judged level of psychosocial risk, with disgruntlement, difficulty accepting
feedback, anger management issues, disengagement, and disregard for
authority having higher weights than other indicators, for example.
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Figure 2: Psychosocial Indicators. Based on our preliminary research,
factors with solid/heavy outlines are considered more important than
those with lighter outlines in determining insider threat risk.

Modeling Framework
A basic premise is the separation of the domain knowledge from the reasoning framework. If domain knowledge is hardcoded within the reasoning framework, then the framework's source code must be changed and
recompiled whenever domain knowledge is updated. Equally important is
the fact that this separation of domain knowledge from the reasoning
framework maintains the domain-agnostic quality of the system, which
enables its application to diverse problems without modification to the
reasoning framework. We use the Ontology Web Language (OWL) as our
knowledge representation language,21 which implements the ontologies
and knowledge bases of the system.
The main components of the CHAMPION system are:
• Ontologies, used for representing the specialized domain knowledge
necessary to reason about the data. They provide the data-typing
mechanisms.
• Reifiers, used for the ingesting of the primitive data types that are specified in the domain ontologies.
• Memory, used to store the facts asserted from the primitive data and
the facts inferred by the reasoning system.
• AMC (reasoning components), used to interpret the data assertions
and infer new assertions.
33
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The analysis of real-world data presents a challenge to computationally
analyze very large graphs. The difficulty is not so much a data reduction
problem as it is a data interpretation problem. If we think of a reasoning
framework as a graph structure, a traditional approach builds the graph
as part of the knowledge engineering process and then, when applied, the
system conducts reasoning over the entire graph. In contrast, the CHAMPION hierarchy of reasoners comprises a "stack" of individual AMCs such
that lower-level AMCs feed higher-level AMCs. The graph structure is
built as data are analyzed; this produces a dynamic belief propagation
network that takes in primitive data and pushes the interpretation of that
data up the hierarchy. We can think of this as interpreting the current
structure in the data and simplifying it with abstracting semantics. Just as
we can stack the AMCs, we can stack collections (regions) of AMCs that
address reasoning or pattern recognition for different domains. Just as
the AMC is analogous to the cortical column, the AMC region is analogous
to a cortical region. Similarly, even higher-level collections of AMCs
enable reasoning across such regions, providing a natural mechanism for
high-level information fusion and analysis that is typically lacking in conventional monitoring/detection systems.
The innovation of using a hierarchical framework of reasoners allows us
to constrain the requirements of each reasoner to a narrowly-defined purpose. We apply a semantic layer upon the data to enable graph-theoretic
approaches for prediction, detection, and mitigation options. With a wellformed semantic layer, we can overcome computational intractability by
performing reasoning on subsets of the semantic graph of data: Rather
than implementing a monolithic reasoner that is required to reason over
all the concepts represented in the entire semantic graph, each reasoner
in the hierarchy is only required to reason about a small set of relevant
concepts.
The belief propagation network performs a transformation of the lowlevel literal inputs into higher-level abstractions. As shown in Figure 3,
the CHAMPION system takes in inputs from various sources and reasons
about them. Ingesting and properly formatting the input data for a given
domain is performed by a reifier, which instantiates the input from a data
source and packages the information into an OWL representation called
an individual. In turn these individuals are instantiated in java objects
called abstractions. The abstractions are added to the Working Memory
of the CHAMPION system.
Reifiers are responsible for asserting OWL individuals (primitives) into
the Working Memory via abstractions. Although great care has been
taken to make sure that AMCs are domain-agnostic, it is not possible to
34
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keep the reifiers domain-agnostic. The reifier takes in raw literal data and
forms an OWL individual that is defined by the domain ontology. When
raw data needs to be reified, specific code is required to convert the raw
data into a data-type defined in the domain ontology.

Figure 3: Functional Layout of CHAMPION Reasoning Process

35
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For example, consider a reifier that is responsible for sensing information
from a computer's security event log. The computer system logs security
events. The responsibility of the reifier is to parse the security event logs
and instantiate OWL individuals, wrap them in an abstraction, and add
the abstraction into the Working Memory. The reifier must parse each
line of the security event log and instantiate a single SecurityEvent individual, where the SecurityEvent is a class defined in the domain ontology.
This abstraction is then inserted into the Working Memory. The AMCs
(organized into various hierarchies, as indicated by the colored squares in
Figure 3) further classify the SecurityEvent abstraction. Figure 4 illustrates this process in more detail. Here, an AMC focusing on failed login
attempts checks the state of the subscribed SecurityEvent to determine if
it matches a hypothesized pattern (in this case the main requirement
would be that its event ID has a value of 529); and if a match occurs, this
even may be typed as a FailedLogin, and a "FailedLogin" assertion is
stored in Working Memory.

Figure 4: Illustration of process in which AMC subscribes to individuals deposited in Working Memory, analyzes the data, and deposits New
Abstraction into Working Memory.
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From a high-level perspective, the AMC subscribes to abstractions from
Working Memory and publishes (infers) new abstractions back to Working Memory. In the CHAMPION system, the term "memory" refers to a
machine-readable Knowledge Base (KB). A machine-readable KB stores
knowledge in a form that can be processed by an inference engine to
accomplish deductive reasoning about new knowledge inferable from current knowledge. A KB constructed with OWL is a collection of individuals,
or instantiations of the class types defined in the domain ontology, which
take the form of a semantic graph. A semantic graph comprises a set of
nodes (the individuals) and the associated relationships (properties)
among them. Therefore, we define a memory as a semantic graph of an
individual, or individuals, in OWL format. There are several KBs in the
CHAMPION system:
• Working Memory (also known as Short-Term Memory) stores the system's growing semantic graph
• Sensory Memory (localized memory in the AMC) stores the current
inputs being reasoned over by the AMC between input cycles
• Episodic Memory (the memories of experience) stores the case library
of the AMC and localized memory in the AMC
The process performed by the AMC within the belief propagation network
of reasoners is shown in Figure 5. The system takes in data with no
semantic tagging. The domain knowledge expressed in the domain ontology provides the data typing (semantic layer) which allows for the semantic tagging of the primitive data types being input into the system via the
reification process. Once the "literal" facts are in the graph, the AMCs
begin the process of further abstraction. New higher-level facts are added
to the graph when the salient facts are present. The individual AMCs in
the belief propagation network execute this process on the small subgraphs of the larger semantic graph.
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Figure 5: Recognition of Inputs and Adding Their Abstractions
Within each AMC there is a modified Knowledge Intensive Case-Based
Reasoning (KI-CBR) structure.22 Unlike traditional Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) systems that compare the current case under consideration
with each case retained in their library of base cases,23 this modified
knowledge-intensive CBR approach uses formal ontological technologies
to reason about the current case.24 The reasoning approach uses Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) expressions.25 If the SWRL rules can successfully construct a logically consistent abstraction from the current
case, the case is added to the library of base cases and asserted back into
the large semantic graph. This methodology offers two opportunities for
the system to "learn:" First, the operator of the belief propagation network can provide feedback in the form of edits to the SWRL rule expressions that the reasoner uses to recognize abstractions. This is a direct
editing of the description logics used to define the abstractions.26 Second,
once a sufficient number of cases have been added to the library of base
cases, statistical analysis of the library can lead to SWRL rule modifications that can better classify future cases.
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This implementation is quite different from the classical approach to
CBR. The classical approach to CBR is to retrieve cases similar to the current problem from a case library. Then each case is reviewed to see if it is a
viable solution to the problem. If it is, apply the solution and go on to the
next problem. If there are no viable solutions in the library, the most similar case is revised to be a viable solution. If the new solution works, the
case is retained in the library for future use.

Operational Perspective
The "big picture" of the overall reasoning process implemented within the
insider threat application of the CHAMPION system is shown in Figure 6.
As described originally by Greitzer and colleagues, we envision the process of model-based reasoning that analyzes patterns of activity from data
to observations to indicators to behaviors.27
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Figure 6: Conceptual model for reasoning framework conveys a sensemaking task as assembling a complex puzzle through an abstraction
process (dataJobservationJindicatorJbehavior). Middle portion of
the figure portrays the hierarchical system of reasoners that implements
the abstraction process.
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In an operational form, the CHAMPION system ingests (reifies) data from
a variety of data sources. These sources include data from SEIM systems,
IDS systems, DLP systems, packet tracking systems, HR systems, etc.
Each of the systems providing input into the CHAMPION reasoning system has an associated domain ontology that provides the data model and
typing for that domain. Stated another way, data from specialized
domains have their own AMC regions in the framework. "Bridging"
domain ontologies defining the correlations between concepts in different
domains are also present. For example, suppose there are three domain
ontologies: (a) a cyber-activity ontology, (b) a social-networking ontology,
and (c) a document-leakage ontology. An example of a concept defined in
the cyber-activity ontology would be a staff member performs an afterhours large download (detection of this action comes from SEIM input).
An example of a concept in the social-networking ontology would be a
large upload to social media. In the document-leakage ontology, we
could represent the concept of suspected document leak that could be
defined as a combination of the after-hours large download and the
large upload to social media. With even higher-level "abstractions"
encoded in the knowledge representations, the system recognizes any of a
number of exploits as equivalent (a print job is similar to a screen capture,
storage of files on portable media, or uploading files to social media, etc.—
all represent possible methods of exfiltrating data). The reasoning framework is therefore "set" to recognize activities that are consistent with patterns defined lower in the reasoning hierarchy, as well as higher-order
patterns that bridge across multiple domains of data. This provides a
more sophisticated approach to monitoring and threat analysis than is
typical in current practice by helping the analyst correlate data over space
and time and across varied data sources. This continual monitoring and
analysis to recognize these types of integrated patterns serves to decrease
the cognitive load on the analyst and focus her attention on possible
threats that present the most critical security risks.

Discussion
We have described the insider threat problem and a particular approach
to proactively addressing the threat using an advanced belief propagation
system that incorporates a variety of assessment data types. Two points
are important to convey regarding this approach. First, it is useful to
consider the problem addressed in more general terms, such as "problems
in the workplace" or nonproductive behaviors in the workplace, and even
issues of workplace violence. In particular, the insider threat problem is
not limited to information technology attacks: consider the events of
November 5, 2009, at Ft. Hood, Texas, where the accused perpetrator,
41
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Army psychiatrist Maj. Nidal Hasan, allegedly opened fire at the Soldier
Readiness Center, killing thirteen people and wounding forty-three
others. According to some accounts, there is evidence that Maj. Hasan
had contact with radical Islamist elements before his shooting spree.28 In
addition to this alleged cyber-use evidence, Maj. Hasan exhibited
behavioral and sociological indicators that could have systematically
alerted his associates and superiors to the high risk he posed. Thus, for
example, the U.S. army Fort Hood Internal Review Team Final Report
provides specific recommendations for pre- and post-deployment
behavioral screening to improve communication among patients,
providers, and commanders;29 for health-care providers to provide
information to commanders relating to indicators of possible violence;
and for training of "… Soldiers to identify and report Soldiers that exhibit
indicators of potential violence and/or potential terrorist behavior…" The
technical approach to threat assessment that we have described in this
article would certainly apply to this type of case, as well as to data
leakage/exfiltration and espionage scenarios.
A second point concerning the generality of the approach is that the reasoning system developed here will address a broad class of decision analytic challenges facing the intelligence and counterintelligence
communities today. Given the domain-independent structure of the
CHAMPION reasoning system, it is straightforward (but not trivial) to
apply this technology to problems in counterterrorism, weapons nonproliferation, and related threat and warning analysis functions. The technical implementation underlying the reasoning framework is closely aligned
with sense-making approaches to decision-support systems that have
been promoted by the cognitive systems engineering research community, especially the general framework that Gary Klein and collaborators
have described as "Recognition-Primed Decision Making" (RPDM).30
Indeed, we suggest that the approach described in the present article
offers one method of implementing an operational version of a RPDM
model.

Conclusion
The insider threat, especially espionage and data leakage involving computer networks, is among the most pressing cyber-security challenges that
threaten government and industry information infrastructures. Unfortunately, no single intrusion detection or threat assessment technique in
wide use today gives a complete picture of the insider threat problem. A
predictive modeling approach to insider threat mitigation was described
that aims to incorporate a diverse set of data sources that not only address
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the cyber domain but also the psychological/motivational factors that
may underlie malicious insider exploits. This comprehensive threat
assessment framework promises to automate the detection of high-risk,
concerning behaviors ("precursors" or "triggers") on which to focus the
attention and inform the analysis of cyber-security personnel, who would
otherwise be required to analyze and correlate an overwhelming amount
of data. Incorporating psychosocial data along with cyber data into the
analysis offers an additional dimension upon which to assess potential
threats within a comprehensive, integrated threat analysis framework.
Current practice tends to be reactive, as it focuses on detecting malicious
acts after they occur, with the aim of identifying and disciplining the perpetrator. In addition, the cyber-security/insider threat analysis process
puts the greatest demand on the analyst for correlating multiple sources
and patterns of data to recognize potential threats. We have developed a
model-based belief propagation framework that uses psychosocial indicators as well as cyber indicators of potential abuse of network resources to
identify and proactively respond to possible malicious exploits. Some
indicators may be observed directly, while others are inferred or derived
from observed data.
Defining triggers in terms of observable cyber and psychosocial indicators
and higher-level aggregated patterns of these behaviors is a major challenge, but also a critical ingredient of a predictive methodology. The
incorporation of psychosocial indicators is a serious matter that must be
conducted with care to protect individual privacy. We have argued elsewhere for the need to apply ethical standards in limiting the type of information monitored and the access to such information by security
analysts,31 while advocating that this is an attainable goal that both protects individual privacy and enables the organization to protect its material, intellectual property, and personnel assets. Prerequisites for a valid
deployment of this approach are effective training for management and
HR personnel in recognizing and reporting behavioral precursors, establishment of policies and mechanisms for addressing insider threats
through formation of interdisciplinary teams (representing management,
HR, security, and counterintelligence perspectives), and proper safeguards and protection of the information from improper use or leakage.
An informed and enlightened organization requires that management and
HR staff be equipped with tools to maintain awareness of worker satisfaction and well-being. However, these tools cannot overstep ethical and privacy boundaries. This allows the organization to respond thoughtfully,
effectively, and proactively to situations that, if unaddressed, may otherwise increase the risk of insider attacks. Further research and technology
development along the lines described in this paper, as well as discussion
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of social and ethical issues in employee monitoring, should remain among
the highest priorities in addressing the insider threat.
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